Social Theory Issues and Librarianship: An Instance

I am still thinking about International Women's Day and the role of women in institutions. I re-read a book by Benhabib that I have enjoyed in the past...

Feminist Social Theories. Seyla Benhabib. Situating the Self.

Summary

In Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics, Seyla Benhabib puts forward a thesis that defends the tradition of universalism. She proposes that a post-Enlightenment universalism is feasible and capable of being carried out.

Benhabib begins her introduction to a twenty-first century understanding of universalism by referencing the Greeks and, also, Hegel. The Greeks provide a dual conception of time that allows us to think of the past, present, and future not only in terms of chronology (kronos), but, also, through the expressions of opportunities (kairos). Contrary to Hegel’s notion of philosophy as understanding the world as it is rather than how it should be (Benhabib writes, “[We] are not like the ‘owl of Minerva’ which spreads its wings only at dusk.”), Benhabib suggests that the present symbolic, social, and political situation is our occasion for opportunity. Today’s “postism” world is a world that recognizes the downfalls of the “project of modernity.” For instance, Benhabib writes that there is “an understandable disillusionment with a form of life that still perpetrates war, armament, environmental destruction and economic exploitation at the cost of satisfying basic human needs with human dignity, a form of life that still relegates many women, non-Christian and non-white peoples to second-class moral and political status, a form of life that saps the bases of solidaristic coexistence in the name of profit and competition” (2). Yet, at the same time, the “project of modernity” harbours certain legacies that are worth reconstructing. Benhabib points out that these legacies include “moral and political universalism, committed to the now seemingly ‘old-fashioned’ and suspect ideals of universal respect for each person in virtue of their humanity; the moral autonomy of the individual; economic and social justice and equality; democratic participation; the most extensive civil and political liberties compatible with principles of justice; and the formation of solidaristic human associations” (2).

A post-Enlightenment universalism, Benhabib suggests, is possible via the disenchantment of metaphysical illusions. The metaphysical illusions of the Enlightenment include those of “a self-transparent and self-grounding reason,” “a disembedded and disembodied object,” and “an Archimedean standpoint” (4). Communitarians, feminists, and postmodernists have offered a voice of critique concerning Enlightenment metaphysical illusions. They have spoken against “the claims of a ‘legislating’ reason” to steer morality, and have revealed its inability “to deal with the indeterminacy and multiplicity of contexts and life-situations with which practical reason is always confronted” (3). Benhabib (influenced by Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas) proposes that there ought to be a formulation of a postmetaphysical universalist position. She describes the postmetaphysical condition in terms of a continual discourse devoid of (psychologically attributed) “givens;” “It is the discourse of the community of inquirers (Charles Sanders Peirce) which first assigns an evidential or other type of value to aspects of our consciousness or experience, and brings them into play as factors which support our claims to the veracity of our beliefs” (5). She suggests that steps must be taken to formulate post-Enlightenment universalism. First, we must move from a substantialistic understanding of reality “to a discursive, communicative concept of rationality” (5). Second, subjects of reason can no longer be understood as disembodied cogitos (Enlightenment) or as “the continuity of a substance in time” (Empiricism); instead, subjects are individuals whom, through contingent processes, author and act upon and within a world narrative (5). It follows that Benhabib recommends a shift from “legislative to interactive rationality” (6). The moral point of view (like reason) is not a timeless Archimedean standpoint; instead, ethical life should be based on “the contingent achievement of an interactive form of rationality” (6).

Benhabib writes that, “[Her] goal is to situate reason and the moral self more decisively in contexts of gender and community, while insisting upon the discursive power of individuals to challenge such situatedness in the name of universalistic principles, future identities and as yet undiscovered communities” (8). Benhabib proposes that via the exercise of “enlarged thinking” (Hannah Arendt) and moral conversation, the principle of universalizability will look forward to communication and agreement. What is not guaranteed in this model is unanimous consensus. However, what this model does demonstrate is “the will and the readiness to seek understanding with the other and to reach some reasonable agreement in an open-ended moral conversation” (9). To cultivate enlarged thinking though, the identity of the moral self must be reconceptualized against legalistic universalism. Instead of relying on the standpoint of the generalized other, the concrete other must be recognized as a reasoning and acting moral person capable of engaging in and pursuing “the good.” If we are to pursue ethical lives through participatory democracy then it is essential for Benhabib to introduce public discourse in her attempts to uphold universalism. She supports a proceduralist model of the public sphere. In the proceduralist model there does not exist an a priori agenda and the agenda lines can be continually “redrawn by the participants in the conversation” (12). It is here that Benhabib brings up the classic distinction between the public and the private. If we are to talk about public discourse then it is imperative to talk about what constitutes the public sphere, what constitutes the private sphere, and the line dividing the two (historically, classically, presently, and looking toward the future). In particular, feminist thought contributes to questions and critiques concerning the public and the private. Such feminist critique points to other epistemological inclinations in Western rationality. For instance, how we understand difference affects/effects our attitudes and practices in connection with gender issues and marginalization. So, Benhabib is not only concerned with a theoretical endorsement of a post-Enlightenment tradition of universalism; she is concerned with how a post-Enlightenment understanding of universalism is relevant in public and private discourse amongst concrete individuals including the marginalized and in the context of gender (without dismissing the voices of postmodernists that fight against logocentrism, imperialism, and the standards of rationality).

One important theme that Benhabib brings up in the introduction is “postconventional Sittlichkeit.” Like Hegel (in Philosophy of Right), she “envisage[s] a universalistic moral point of view as situated within an ethical community” (11). For our purposes, Sittlichkeit can be understood as referring to “ethical life” in reference to normative morality. Sittlichkeit describes the ethical norms that should guide our everyday practical reasoning. These ethical norms should be dialogical and directly associated with the duties and virtues embedded in central institutions of modern social life (i.e. the family, civil society, and the state). Hegel rejects, for example, Plato and Kant’s notions of Sittlichkeit because “the good life” is both ahistorical and definitively prescriptive in nature. Hegel’s understanding of “the moral point of view” is descriptive and, also, normative. Benhabib’s pursuit for a postconventional Sittlichkeit can be understood via Hegel’s framework. This is important to Benhabib because her understanding of “postconventional” Sittlichkeit is different than the integrationist perspective of certain communitarian thinkers (Michael Sandel and Alasdair ManIntyre). She is concerned that conventional thinkers often become too reliant upon their own particular tradition. She says, “[They] seek to reconstitute community via recouping and reclaiming an integrative vision of fundamental values and principles…” (11). In contrast to integrationists, she supports the participationists because they “envisage such a community as emerging from common action, engagement and debate in the civic and public realms of democratic societies” (11).

On one hand I resonate with integrationist thinkers. For instance, their emphasis upon one’s own tradition (roots) is appealing not only in terms of the psyche but in terms of practical actions (within a given context). In After Virtue, MacIntyre writes, “A central thesis then begins to emerge: man is in his actions and practice, as well as in his fictions, essentially a story-telling animal. He is not essentially, but becomes through his history, a teller of stories that aspire to truth. But the key question for men is not about their own authorship; I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’” (216). I wonder, for the participationists, how it is possible to find/situate oneself within a specific and contextualized story/history (familial, religious, gender situated, communal)? At the same time, however, integrationists may(?) be more likely (at least in theory) to fall prey to stories that are not “authentic” or “good.” (Certainly people find themselves growing up in and situated in inauthentic and bad traditions; for instance, the KKK). In practicality, though, if we are to combat certain negative forces (poverty, oppression, marginalization, armament, warfare, etc.) in a healthy and communicative way, I must lean toward Benhabib’s proposal for a postconventional Sittlichkeit that is politically participatory (Also see Nancy Fraser’s writings on “participatory parity.”). Society’s current state of (worldwide) deplorable conditions cannot be (significantly) fought from inside the integrationist circles. Democratic participatory politics is better able to confront widespread problems on a legal and generally larger consequential scale.

(The discussion of postconventional Sittlichkeit raises, for me, two concerns: How do we reason with those whom we resolutely disagree? In a world where pluralism prevails, what is/becomes the common experience to reason from?)

A second important issue that Benhabib raises in the introduction is the theme of the public and the private. She expresses concern on behalf of those that have typically been marginalized in public discourse and in public policy, and places some blame on the liberal position of subjective neutrality within the public arena. She writes, “My argument is that the constraint of neutrality illicitly limits the agenda of public conversation and excludes particularly those groups like women and blacks who have not been traditional partners in the liberal dialogue” (12). Like Benhabib, Jaggar also argued against the liberal political theory concerning the public and the private. Jaggar criticizes neutrality not only in terms of gender and race, but also in terms of government regulations and economics (144).

I want to touch here, specifically, on the context of gender. I think that there are structures of gender built-in to the contemporary public sphere. This seems obvious when mentioning, for example, the gender hierarchy that gives men more power in society. Also, this hierarchy is not typically looked at in terms of the private realm where men also tend to have more power. As the public and the private sectors remain theoretically and legally unquestioned, men, in general, continue to have power over women (via the media, mentally, vocationally, politically, and oftentimes culturally) and, in turn, this power-over becomes built-in to society. We ought to be questioning the line (Where is it at? Should there be one? How do women (and others) cross the line? Legally? Illegally?) that divides the public and the private and its epistemological presuppositions and its practical implications.

As women librarians, how do we face and tackle such issues?